Identity and Political Theory by Hayward, Clarissa Rile & Watson, Ron
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 33 The Politics of Identity after Identity Politics 
January 2010 
Identity and Political Theory 
Clarissa Rile Hayward 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Ron Watson 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clarissa Rile Hayward and Ron Watson, Identity and Political Theory, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 9 (2010), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/3 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
9 
Identity and Political Theory 
Clarissa Rile Hayward  
Ron Watson  
Identity politics is the politics in which people engage when they 
mobilize on the basis of, and when they define their experiences, 
their political problems, and their aims in terms of the good of 
identity-groups. Historically, identity politics grew out of the 
experience of identity-based oppression: the experience of 
inequalities in resources and opportunities that people encountered as 
members of particular identity groups. According to the Combahee 
River Collective, the black feminist lesbian organization that 
published the famous Combahee River Collective Statement in the 
late 1970s, ―focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the 
concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and 
potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own 
identity. . .‖1 Identity politics is conceptually distinct, then, from a 
liberal politics organized on the basis of individual interests and 
preferences. 
When political theory treats identity politics, it focuses 
specifically on analytic, normative and political questions, asking 
how the state should treat identity groups and/or the claims that 
people advance in their name. Although the impetus for the political 
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WRITINGS, WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 175, 180 (Miriam Schneir ed.). 
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theory debate on identity was the rise of the so-called new social 
movements of the late twentieth century, the focus of the key thinkers 
who launched the debate was ―cultural minorities,‖ that is, groups 
that demand from the majority society what Charles Taylor, 
following Hegel, termed ―recognition.‖2 Taylor‘s thinking about 
cultural minorities informed his strong multiculturalist claim that 
states should recognize (some) identity-groups, by granting them 
special rights, privileges, and legal exemptions, with a view to 
enabling collective goals—for example, preserving the integrity of 
minority linguistic communities.
3
 We treat this argument in Part I of 
our Article. We then move to the liberal multiculturalist position, 
which stresses the importance of recognition for promoting individual 
freedom and autonomy (Part II), and the Foucaultian view, which 
underscores that identities can limit freedom, and hence that 
nontrivial political dangers can attend state recognition (Part III).  
In the second half of our Article, after assessing the strong 
multiculturalist, the liberal multiculturalist, and the Foucaultian views 
(Part IV) we advance an argument against the framing of the identity 
politics debate in terms of state recognition. States never merely 
recognize identities, our claim is. Instead, they play a critical role in 
helping produce and reproduce them, shaping the ways people 
identify, and the ways they organize and act politically (Part V). The 
question for political theory, then, is not whether states should 
intervene in identity-constitution, but how. States should intervene in 
identity-construction in democracy-promoting ways, our argument is: 
specifically, in ways that promote nondomination, by enabling those 
persons who are affected by identitarian norms, practices, and 
boundaries to participate effectively in making and re-making them. 
I. BEYOND TOLERATION: THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING IDENTITY 
For more than three centuries, the standard liberal answer to 
questions of identity and difference was toleration. To tolerate is ―to 
allow to exist or to be done or practiced without authoritative 
 
 2. CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING 
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25–36 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994); see also infra Part I. 
 3. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 58–59. 
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interference or molestation.‖4 Liberal philosophers from John Locke 
to J.S. Mill to John Rawls made the case that political communities 
should tolerate (some set, or some range, of) minority actions and 
beliefs.
5
 States should delineate clearly a bounded political sphere, by 
this view, and should refrain from interfering in social practices 
outside that sphere—practices that include, typically, religious 
practices, and more generally those shaped by controversial moral 
and social systems of belief and value. Toleration, by the liberal 
view, protects the rights of individuals and promotes peaceful 
coexistence across identitarian divides.
6
 
Toward the close of the twentieth century, however, political 
theorizing about identity and difference took an important turn, as 
some thinkers began to grapple with claims advanced by nationalists, 
by feminists, and by participants in the so-called ―new social 
movements.‖ In his seminal essay, ―The Politics of Recognition,‖ the 
philosopher Charles Taylor made the case that, very often, liberal 
toleration is not enough.
7
 Some cultural minorities, Taylor argues, 
 
 4. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1991). 
 5. See generally JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully 
ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1689)); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Henry Regnery 
Co. 1955) (1859)); JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS 388 (1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 47–88 (1993). 
 6. There is an extensive literature on liberal theories of toleration. See, e.g., Ingrid 
Creppell, Locke on Toleration: The Transformation of Constraint, 24 POL. THEORY 200 (1996); 
David Heyd, Introduction to TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 3 (David Heyd ed., 1996); Will 
Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance, 13 ANALYSE & KRITIK 33–56 (1992); 
Andrew R. Murphy, Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition, 29 POLITY 593 (1997); 
Samuel Scheffler, The Appeal of Political Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 4 (1994); Bernard Williams, 
Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra at 18. Several 
authors have also provided important critiques of toleration as an answer to problems of identity 
and difference. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Reflections on Tolerance in the Age of Identity, in 
DEMOCRACY AND VISION: SHELDON WOLIN AND THE VICISSITUDES OF THE POLITICAL (Aryeh 
Botwinick & William E. Connolly eds., 2001); Kristie M. McClure, Difference, Diversity, and 
the Limits of Toleration, 18 POL. THEORY 361 (1990). 
 7. Taylor, supra note 2. The importance of Taylor‘s essay for the identity politics debate 
in political theory cannot be overstated. Still, it is worth noting that the ideas developed there 
have a rich history, reaching back at least as far as Hegel and Herder. Id. at 26, 30 (mentioning 
Hegel‘s master and slave dialect as an example of philosophy paving the way for recognition 
today and Herder as influential to the ideal of authenticity). In addition, the contours of Taylor‘s 
view can be seen in Isaiah Berlin‘s famous 1958 lecture, Two Concepts of Liberty. According to 
Berlin (who was Taylor‘s mentor), ―I am what I am as a result of social forces . . . some, 
perhaps all, of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social 
identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am . . . an element.‖ 
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demand more than noninterference; they demand the affirmative 
acknowledgment—in his terms, the recognition—of their constitutive 
identities.
8
 This demand, by Taylor=s account, is based on the 
distinctly modern thesis that people‘s well-being is bound up with the 
formation and maintenance of authentic identities.
9
 Because people 
forge their understandings of who they are ―dialogically,‖ that is, 
because they learn their identities through interactions and exchanges 
with others, ―a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror[s] back to 
them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves.‖10 Not just interference, but also misrecognition can be a 
nontrivial harm.  
In ―The Politics of Recognition,‖ Taylor moved from this insight 
to make the case for the accommodation of cultural minorities, such 
as aboriginal peoples or national minorities like the Canadian 
Quebecois, by dominant and/or majority communities.
11
 He made the 
case, in particular, for the granting of special rights, and/or special 
privileges or exemptions, designed to promote, not individual 
freedom, so much as collective ends.
12
 Doing so, his claim was, can 
be crucial to advancing people‘s well-being, if it protects a collective 
identity they experience as deeply constitutive of their personal 
identities. 
The principal example Taylor used was that of the proposed 
Meech amendment to the Canadian Charter of Rights in 1987.
13
 His 
focus was the ―distinct society‖ clause, which, had the amendment 
passed, would have permitted the province of Quebec to restrict some 
of the individual freedoms granted by the Charter to all Canadian 
 
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 155 (1969) (Isaiah 
Berlin ed., 1969). Individual status, Berlin argues, is deeply imbricated with social 
relationships, and in particular with the status of the groups to which individuals belong. Id. at 
154–62.  
 8. See Taylor, supra note 2. 
 9. See id. at 28–32. 
 10. Id. at 25. 
 11. See id. at 51–61. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. at 52–53. See CANADA, STRENGTHENING THE CANADIAN FEDERATION: THE 
CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT (1987) (containing the Meech Lake Accord); see also 1987 
Constitutional Accord (June 3, 1987), available at http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/ 
English/Proposals/MeechLake.html. 
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citizens.
14
 These included, for French-speaking parents in Quebec, 
the freedom to educate children in English language schools. They 
included, for some business owners, the freedom to conduct their 
businesses and to print commercial signage in the English language. 
This case was useful for purposes of Taylor=s argument, since it pitted 
against one another two types of freedoms he claimed moderns 
might, in principle, value: the freedom of the individual to choose her 
ends and her actions (to choose whether to educate her child in the 
language of her minority cultural community, for example, or 
alternatively in the dominant language of her political society) 
against the freedom of the collectivity to preserve its traditions and 
practices (Quebecois linguistic practices, in this instance).  
By the conventional view, Taylor argued, granting individuals 
equal respect requires treating them equally: defining rights 
uniformly, in other words, and thus enabling each person to choose 
her aims as well as her actions.
15
 But if an important part of ―who I 
am‖ as an individual is ―who we are‖—how I identify socially—then 
my well-being depends, in part, on collective goods. Some of the 
ends most crucial to my personal well-being are ends I can realize 
only together with others. The integrity of my culture, the survival of 
the community that helps define my sense of who I am, affects my 
well-being more powerfully than does my freedom to make some of 
the choices assigned by many liberal accounts to the protected private 
sphere.  
This is the principal philosophical claim Taylor advanced in ―The 
Politics of Recognition.‖ To address the normative-political question 
at the heart of the debate he helped launch—the question of how 
states should treat identity groups and the claims advanced in their 
name—Taylor made two key distinctions. He distinguished, first, 
between equal dignity and equal recognition, where equal dignity is a 
product of the ―difference blind‖ treatment exemplified by the 
politics of rights, and equal recognition is a product of equal respect 
for group identities, or at least the presumption (prior to cross-
cultural dialogue and evaluation) that all groups deserve equal 
 
 14. Taylor, supra note 2, at 52; see also CANADA, STRENGTHENING THE CANADIAN 
FEDERATION: THE CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT, supra note 13. 
 15. Taylor, supra note 2. 
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respect.
16
 He distinguished, second, between what he called 
―fundamental‖ rights—―rights to life, liberty, due process, free 
speech, free practice of religion, and so on‖ and less basic liberties: 
liberties that, even if of value, he argued, states sometimes should 
trade or limit in the interest of promoting equal respect.
17
 States 
should grant their citizens equal respect, in other words, and doing so 
can require restricting their liberties differentially. In the Quebecois 
case, Taylor suggested, Canada should have enabled Quebecois 
national survival, even at the expense of individual freedom of 
educational choice and the freedom to pursue commercial success by 
conducting business in English. 
This position–call it the strong multiculturalist position–posed an 
important challenge for liberal theories of toleration. Other strong 
multiculturalists follow Taylor closely. Bikhu Parekh, to cite one 
prominent example, makes the case that, although liberal political 
societies should not accommodate all minority group practices, they 
cannot determine in the abstract, as a matter of principle, which 
should be permitted and which should not. Instead, states should 
make that determination via an ―open-minded intercommunal 
dialogue aimed at evolving a reasonable consensus.‖18  
Liberal understandings of rights and justice, the claim is, are 
culturally particularistic. It is wrong-headed to assume they are 
universalistic. Although a given liberal society‘s values might, in 
principle, converge upon ―the right values‖ (if such values, in fact, 
exist), the dangers that follow from coercive state imposition of 
falsely universalized norms outweigh those that follow from state 
accommodation of practices not justified by liberal principles. Thus, 
according to Parekh, moral truths (if they exist) are more likely to be 
discovered if ―other points of view enjoy sufficient cultural self-
 
 16. See id. at 61–73. For a helpful discussion on various multiculturalists‘ formulations of 
equality and inequality, see TARIQ MODOOD, MULTICULTURALISM 51–58 (2007). 
 17. Taylor, supra note 2, at 59.  
 18. Bhikhu Parekh, Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration, 30 INT‘L MIGRATION 
REV. 251, 261–62 (1996) [hereinafter Parekh, Minority Practices]; see also BHIKHU PAREKH, A 
NEW POLITICS OF IDENTITY: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 89–95 
(2008); BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY (2000). 
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confidence, political power, and opportunity to enter into a serious 
dialogue with the liberal West.‖19 
II. CULTURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL: LIBERAL THEORIES OF 
RECOGNITION 
Skepticism of liberalism‘s neutrality is at the center of the strong 
multiculturalist view. An alternative approach to political theorizing 
about identity also takes as its starting point the Herderian insight 
about the importance to individuals of culture and community, but 
theorizes that importance in terms of promoting specifically liberal 
values. The philosopher most strongly associated with this second 
approach is Will Kymlicka, who, in his 1989 Liberalism, Community, 
and Culture, makes the case that liberal societies should recognize 
minority cultural groups, ―not because they have some moral status 
of their own, but because it‘s only through having a rich and secure 
cultural structure that people can become aware . . . of the options 
available to them, and intelligently examine their value.‖20  
Kymlicka‘s argument, first elaborated in this 1989 book and then 
developed in a series of later books and articles, is that the liberal 
tradition articulates two key preconditions for living a good life.
21
 
The first, which tracks closely to Taylor‘s claims about the 
importance of cultural survival and recognition, is that people be able 
to live their lives ―from the inside‖: to live, that is, in ways that 
accord with their most deeply held beliefs and their most cherished 
values.
22
 The second, however, is that people be able to question their 
 
 19. Parekh, Minority Practices, supra note 18, at 256. Here Parekh follows closely Mill‘s 
argument in On Liberty. The principal difference between Mill‘s view and Parekh‘s is the unit 
of analysis: for Mill, the liberal society should tolerate diverse ways of life for individuals, 
while for Parekh, the liberal society should tolerate diverse ways of life for cultural groups.  
 20. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 165 (1989). 
 21. Kymlicka has authored several works besides LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND 
CULTURE on identity politics and multiculteralism. See generally FINDING OUR WAY: 
RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA (1998); MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: 
A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL 
CITIZENSHIP]; MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS: NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
OF DIVERSITY (2007); POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, 
AND CITIZENSHIP (2001); Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883 (1989); 
The Rights of Minority Cultures: a Reply to Kukathas, 20 POL. THEORY 140–46 (1992). 
 22. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 21, at 81. 
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beliefs and their values, and to revise or even reject them if they 
decide to do so. This second capacity, Kymlicka emphasizes, requires 
both ―awareness of different views about the good life, and also an 
ability to examine those views intelligently.‖23  
To be aware of other ways of life and capable of critical reflection 
on one‘s own, Kymlicka notes, people need educational 
opportunities.
24
 They also need liberal freedoms, such as freedom of 
speech and association.
25
 In addition, he underscores, they need what 
he calls a ―societal culture‖: a culture that provides for its members‘ 
meaning ―across the full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
both public and private spheres.‖26 An individual‘s societal culture, 
the claim is, enables her not only to live ―from the inside,‖ but also, 
because it makes choices meaningful for her, to live relatively 
autonomously.
27
 To choose ends and actions, people need a 
vocabulary.
28
 They need access to a ―cultural narrative‖ with which 
to make sense of the range of choices they encounter. ―Cultures are 
valuable not in and of themselves, but because it is only through 
having access to a societal culture that people have a range of 
meaningful options.‖29 
Culture, Kymlicka claims, is a necessary precondition for liberal 
autonomy.
30
 Because people can change societal cultures only at 
considerable cost, he argues, states should not compel them to do so 
as the price for living lives autonomously and ―from the inside.‖31 To 
the contrary, even liberal states, which aim to foster liberal values, 
often must accommodate and in other ways recognize minority 
 
 23. Id.  
 24. See id. at 81–82. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 76. Thus, Taylor‘s examples of the Quebecois and aboriginal tribes are, in 
Kymlicka‘s terminology, societal cultures. Id. at 79–80. Kymlicka‘s claim that belonging to a 
societal culture is a precondition for living a good life has been subject to a range of persuasive 
critiques. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992) (providing a cosmopolitan critique of this claim). 
 27. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 21, at 81–83. 
 28. Id. at 83. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 84. 
 31. Id. at 85. 
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cultures to ensure that individuals have the continued access to their 
societal cultures that they need in order to live autonomously.
32
  
This claim marks a significant departure from Taylor‘s argument. 
If Taylor sees the individual‘s freedom to choose as, at least at times, 
in conflict with the flourishing of the collectivities with which she 
identifies, Kymlicka conceives the flourishing of that collectivity as 
instrumental to promoting individual freedom and choice.
33
 To the 
extent that, and only to the extent that it does, his claim is, there is a 
case to be made for state recognition of social groups. In particular, 
Kymlicka argues, there is a strong case to be made for granting what 
he calls ―group-differentiated‖ rights when those rights promote 
equality between groups without threatening the autonomy of group 
members.
34
 ―External protections‖—rights and exemptions that 
protect minority groups from the dominant society—very often, he 
suggests, meet this test.
35
 By contrast, ―internal restrictions‖—rules 
that allow groups to place demands upon their members—are more 
likely to threaten individual autonomy.
36
 By Kymlicka‘s view, ―what 
distinguishes a liberal theory of minority rights is . . . that it accepts 
some external protections . . . but is very skeptical of internal 
restrictions.‖37 
 
 32. Id. at 86. 
 33. Compare Taylor, supra note 2, at 60, with KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, 
supra note 21, at 83. 
 34. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 21, at 87. 
 35. Id. at 35–37. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 7. Kymlicka distinguishes not only between ―internal restrictions‖ and ―external 
protections,‖ but also among three types of rights, which different types of minority cultural 
groups demand: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. Id. 
at 6–7, 26–33. He discusses these in depth in chapter two of MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP. 
Sketched broadly, his claim is that ―national minorities‖—territorially concentrated groups that 
have been coercively incorporated into a larger state—often demand, and often have a 
legitimate claim to, ―various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as 
distinct societies.‖ Id. at 10. ―Ethnic groups,‖ by contrast, often seek to assimilate, rather than to 
maintain distinct societies, and often demand and have a legitimate claim to, ―polyethnic rights‖ 
―to express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the 
economic and political institutions of the dominant society.‖ Id. at 10, 31. See generally JACOB 
T, LEVY, THE MULTICULTURALISM OF FEAR ch. 5 (2000) (containing helpful extension of 
Kymlicka‘s classification rights); JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE ch. 2 (1994) (discussing race, ethnicity, 
and nationality: a typology of identity groups similar to Kymlicka‘s).  
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Following Kymlicka, other liberal theorists advance similar 
claims for state recognition of minority groups or cultures. 
Recognition, they argue, is necessary, at least in some cases, to 
promote autonomy and/or freedom. Joseph Raz, for instance, 
emphasizes that freedom, understood as meaningful choice within a 
rule-bound context, is dependent upon the social practices people 
create and re-create in groups.
38
  
But liberal thinkers are not undivided on the political-normative 
question of whether, and if so why and how, states should recognize 
minority cultures. Some advance arguments for promoting the 
majority liberal culture, on the grounds that ―nation-building‖ is 
important for the maintenance of a liberal society. Common identity, 
their claim is, a sense of solidaristic belonging, and shared language 
and other practices and traditions are preconditions for successful and 
stable liberal democratic governance.
39
  
Even those who endorse the liberal multiculturalist position 
debate which liberal values are most central to the tradition and 
which are most important for states to promote. They debate, as well, 
how best to negotiate conflicts or trade-offs among liberal values. 
Thus for Chandran Kukathas, not autonomy, but neutrality and 
freedom of association, are the key values at stake.
40
 Liberal states 
should remain as neutral as possible vis-à-vis minority cultures, his 
claim was, while protecting individual freedom of association.
41
 
States should protect freedom of association, Kukathas underscores, 
even in those cases in which individuals choose to associate with 
illiberal groups.
42
 In his words, ―No one should be forced to accept 
 
 38. Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 170, 175–77 (1994). Raz 
underscores, as well (with Taylor), that people‘s well-being depends upon the flourishing and 
affirmative recognition of their constitutive identities. Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 2, at 25–
37. He also stresses that shared culture facilitates the formation of deep and lasting 
interpersonal relationships. Raz, supra, at 177. 
 39. ―Liberal nationalists‖ do not necessarily support the protection of multiple identity 
groups within a liberal society. In other words, they are not necessarily multiculturalists. See 
DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995); see also YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (3d 
prtg. 1995). 
 40. See Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 
(1992); see also CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO (2007).  
 41. Kukathas, supra note 40, at 127. 
 42. Id. at 127. 
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any particular ideal of the good life‖—least of all through the actions 
of a liberal state.
43
 Nor, he emphasizes, should liberal states compel 
minority groups to promote the autonomy of their members.
44
 
Kukathas‘s argument has been influential. It has received 
considerable uptake within the political theory debate on identity 
politics. If liberal states only protect groups and enable group 
membership in those instances in which doing so promotes 
autonomy, his central insight is, but fail to do so in those instances in 
which it undermines autonomy, then they do not remain neutral 
among conceptions of the good.
45
 
At the same time, the claims staked out by Kukathas have been 
the target of much criticism. Kukathas overestimates the ease with 
which the members of identity groups can exit those groups, some 
argue.
46
 In Anne Phillips‘s words, identities cannot be ―readily put on 
or taken off.‖47 They are often imposed by others, rather than 
voluntarily adopted.
48
 What is more, even when identities are not 
imposed, ―taking them off‖ almost always entails significant cost.49 
Some people lack desirable exit options.
50
 Some lack the material 
resources that exit requires. Some simply cannot imagine exiting their 
identity group.
51
 Hence, Brian Barry‘s claim that, if a liberal is 
―someone who holds that there are certain rights against oppression, 
 
 43. Id. at 108. 
 44. Id. at 122. 
 45. Commenting on this debate, William Galston distinguishes what he calls ―reformation 
liberalism‖ (the liberalism of Kukathas), which concerns itself primarily with neutrality and 
toleration, from ―enlightenment liberalism‖ (the liberalism of Kymlicka), which is concerned to 
promote a particular vision of the human good, typically autonomy. See William Galston, Two 
Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516–34 (1995); see also WILLIAM GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
15–27 (2002).  
 46. See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, MULTICULTURALISM WITHOUT CULTURE 138–50 (2007); 
Ayelet Shachar, On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability, 28 POL. THEORY 64 (2000).  
 47. PHILLIPS, supra note 46, at 133.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 144–49. 
 50. Id. at 140–41. 
 51. Id. at 148–50. Several other authors have written about the difficulties of exiting 
groups. See BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM 150–54 (2001); Susan Moller Okin, ―Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: 
Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205–30 (2002); see also 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH ch. 
2 (2000). 
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exploitation, and injury,‖ a near-neutral state of the sort Kukathas 
seems to envision is not, in fact, a liberal state.
52
 To the contrary, 
such a state undermines the very rights liberals cherish and protect.
53
  
Kukathas‘s view is not the only liberal alternative to Kymlicka‘s 
multiculturalism on offer. To cite just one more example, Jacob 
Levy, following Judith Shklar, has made the case for what he calls 
the ―multiculturalism of fear‖: a multiculturalism committed to 
―preventing political violence, cruelty, and institutional humiliation,‖ 
rather than to promoting autonomy or neutrality vis-à-vis 
particularistic conceptions of the good.
54
 Working to avert the most 
profound injustices, Levy‘s claim is, sometimes requires that states 
recognize identities and/or that they accommodate minority cultural 
practices.
55
 Still, Levy sides with Kymlicka, against Taylor, in 
arguing that groups are not entitled to respect or recognition.
56
 
Instead, groups deserve state recognition only to the extent that it is 
necessary to prevent violence and other harms.
57
  
Notwithstanding real differences among them, liberal contributors 
to the political theory debate on identity politics agree with one 
another (and with strong multiculturalists) that promoting the well-
being of individuals sometimes requires states to recognize group 
difference. At least in some cases, they agree, liberal states should 
accommodate minority cultures and other identity-groups. The 
challenge from the liberal perspective, however, is to balance the 
value to be gained from granting protections, rights, or exemptions to 
groups—whether in the name of autonomy, neutrality, or the 
prevention of violence—against the threat groups might pose to the 
rights, freedoms, and autonomy of their members. Not all of the 
 
 52. BARRY, supra note 51, at 132. 
 53. See id. at 131–46. 
 54. LEVY, supra note 37, at 16. Levy‘s reference is to Judith Shklar‘s influential essay 
―The Liberalism of Fear.‖ Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE 
MORAL LIFE 21–38 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989).  
 55. See LEVY, supra note 37, at 17. 
 56. Id. at 31–33. 
 57. Id. at 14–15. Identities are not sources of value for individuals, by this view, so much 
as sources of potential hazards for the larger society. In Levy‘s words, ―The multiculturalism of 
fear . . . see[s] ethnic communities as morally important and distinctive, not because of what 
they provide for individuals, but because of what they risk doing to common social and political 
life.‖ Id. at 33.  
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collective aims of identity groups are worthy of accommodation, 
liberal theorists underscore. Instead, individual rights and freedoms 
are paramount. Collective ends, their claim is, although worthy of 
state support when such support is necessary to promote rights and 
freedoms, rarely, if ever, should override rights and freedoms 
altogether.  
III. SUBJECTIFICATION: THE DARK SIDE OF IDENTITY 
If liberal theorists develop their claims in response to Taylor‘s 
argument for the recognition of cultural minorities, those theorists 
typically labeled ―poststructuralists‖ develop theirs often without 
engaging debates on multicultural accommodation. Not only for this 
reason, but also due to methodological and stylistic differences, it can 
be challenging to put this third group of theorists into dialogue with 
the first two. Still, we will try.  
Stated crudely, political theorists like Wendy Brown
58
 and 
William Connolly,
59
 cultural theorists like Judith Butler,
60
 and legal 
theorists like Richard Thompson Ford
61
 draw on Foucaultian insights 
about subjectification to highlight the harms identities produce.
62
 
Collective identities, their claim is—not only those of cultural 
minorities, but also those of the racial, ethnic, gendered, sexual, and 
other groups that stand at the center of identity politics—exclude at 
their boundaries, and internally, they normalize. What is more, 
working together, the universe of recognized identities defines what 
counts as intelligible ways of living and being, thus rendering 
unintelligible those who fall within no identity-category. For people 
who conform, identities serve as mechanisms of power that constrain 
 
 58. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 
(1995). 
 59. See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF 
POLITICAL PARADOX 1–15 (1991). 
 60. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 171–77 (1999). 
 61. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 1–21, 36–38 (2005). 
 62. For Foucault, ―subjectification‖ signals a process by which a human being is made 
into, and actively participates in making herself into, a subject. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, The 
Subject and Power: Afterward to HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT 
BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208 (2d ed. 1983). 
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freedom. For people who do not, they are mechanisms of power that 
legitimize violence and coercion. 
Of those who contribute to this third line of political theorizing 
about identity, William Connolly is the most explicit about its 
ontological presuppositions. Against strong multiculturalists, who 
assume that recognizing authentic identities promotes well-being, and 
against liberal multiculturalists who assume that fostering practices of 
autonomy, or promoting state neutrality vis-à-vis conceptions of the 
good, does the same, Connolly makes the case for regarding all 
identitarian practices as ―ambiguous goods.‖63 Humans need identity, 
he agrees with Taylor and other multiculturalists.
64
 Yet it may be the 
case, he underscores, that they do not fit naturally and perfectly into 
any actual or, for that matter, any conceivable identity-category. If so, 
then every identity, every form of subjectivity—not excluding that of 
the modern, autonomous self—creates ―others‖ whose exclusion 
and/or whose normalization it legitimizes. In Connolly‘s words, ―If 
humans are not predesigned, and if they therefore are ill suited to fit 
neatly into any particular social form, then any set of enabling 
commonalities is likely to contain corollary injuries, cruelties, 
subjugations, concealments, and restrictions. . . .‖65 
Consider, again, Charles Taylor‘s insight that, for moderns, 
―misrecognition‖ can be an important harm.66 Connolly and other 
theorists in this third group might respond by arguing that pressure to 
conform to naturalized and other deeply entrenched identities 
constitutes a separate, and a no less significant, harm. Such pressure 
harms, first of all, people who do not perform their ascribed identities 
well: people who fail to conform to identitarian norms, and as a 
result, are excluded or marginalized or otherwise sanctioned. Richard 
Ford illustrates with the example of a ―strong and assertive woman‖ 
who fails to perform well her gendered role on the dance floor.
67
 
She will be encouraged by dance instructors, parents, potential 
partners, and friends to conform to the female role: [to] learn to 
 
 63. CONNOLLY, supra note 59, at 98. 
 64. See id. at 87–92. 
 65. Id. at 93. 
 66. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. 
 67. FORD, supra note 61, at 63. 
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accept the guidance of the male, [and to] develop grace at the 
expense of strength. If she does not conform, her friends will 
sanction her by telling her that she could get a date easily if she 
were a bit ―nicer‖ or ―more feminine.‖ Men will silently 
punish her by refusing to ask her to dance. If she wants to 
dance, she will conform.
68
  
Second, pressure to conform to collective identities harms those 
who do fit, theorists writing in this tradition emphasize—or rather, 
those who seem, based on their behavior and observable patterns of 
action, as if they fit. It harms those people, that is, who live their lives 
more or less as established identities prescribe. Imagine a woman 
who, unlike the woman in Ford‘s example, performs her gender 
identity in an exemplary fashion. She exhibits ―niceness‖ and grace 
and femininity. She fails to develop her strength, or at least she hides 
it. She is rarely, if ever assertive. This woman is not obviously better 
off, the claim is, than the woman who refuses her gendered role. 
Granted, the conforming behavior wins her social approbation, along 
with the rewards that accompany a good performance. But still, the 
cost is nontrivial. ―Normalization‖—discipline, that is (including 
self-discipline), which aims at conformity to social norms—is an 
important loss of freedom.
69
 Conformity to collective identities 
damages that in the self that is resistant to definitions of ―normal 
individuality‖ and/or ―harmonious community.‖70 
Third and finally, pressure to conform to collective identities 
harms those who do not fit identity categories at all. Judith Butler‘s 
autobiographical illustration of this third point is worth quoting at 
length:  
I grew up understanding something of the violence of gender 
norms: an uncle incarcerated for his anatomically anomalous 
body, deprived of family and friends, living out his days in an 
―institute‖ in the Kansas prairies; gay cousins forced to leave 
their homes because of their sexuality, real and imagined; my 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. See CONNOLLY, supra note 59, at 34–35. 
 70. Id. at 31. 
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own tempestuous coming out at the age of 16; and a 
subsequent adult landscape of lost jobs, lovers, and homes.
71
 
Constructed norms defining the identities female/feminine and 
male/masculine fuel violence, not only to those who perform their 
identities poorly (and those who perform them well), but also to 
those—here gays, the intersexed—whom norms define out of 
constructed categories altogether.  
Social actors construct identities, by this third view. The identities 
they construct never neatly fit the human beings they claim to 
describe. Still, people essentialize identity. They experience it as the 
root cause of traits, behaviors, dispositions, and desires: a deep truth 
about the self, rather than a set of norms and standards that might be 
otherwise. This essentialization depoliticizes identity. In Wendy 
Brown‘s words, ―‗differences‘ that are the effects of social power are 
neutralized through their articulation as attributes.‖72 Hence, on 
balance, state recognition of identities does not promote well-being 
and freedom. It does not prevent violence and cruelty. Instead, it 
exacerbates normalization and coercive subjectification. What is 
worse, recognition lends the authority of the state to those who police 
identity. According to Brown: 
While the effort to replace liberalism‘s abstract formulation of 
equality with legal recognition of injurious social 
stratifications is understandable, what such arguments do not 
query is whether legal ―protection‖ for a certain injury-forming 
identity discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection 
it denounces.
73
  
―Might such protection codify within the law,‖ Brown asks, 
rhetorically, ―the very powerlessness it aims to redress? Might it 
discursively collude with the conversion of attribute into identity, of a 
historical effect of power into a presumed cause of victimization?‖74 
In ―recognizing‖ identity, in fighting for identity‘s affirmative 
acknowledgment by agents of the state, the worry is we risk inviting 
 
 71. BUTLER, supra note 60, at xix. 
 72. BROWN, supra note 58, at 66. 
 73. Id. at 21. 
 74. Id. 
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the construction of a ―plastic cage,‖ which ―reproduces and further 
regulates‖ the very subjects it claims to protect, while remaining 
(unlike Weber‘s ―iron cage‖) ―quite transparent to the ordinary 
eye.‖75 
Hence, the poststructuralist emphasis on what many argue is the 
politically urgent and potentially liberating task of destabilizing 
identities: drawing attention to their constructedness and fluidity, and 
opening up possibilities for new ways of living and being. Foucault 
urged not the recognition but the ―refusal‖ of identity.76 Many 
contributors to this third strand of theorizing about identity politics 
view his archaeological and genealogical methods as key means to 
that end.
77
 Many advocate as well the promotion of agonistic 
engagement, or contestation, among constructed identities.
78
 The 
value of new social movements, by their view, is less the securing of 
recognition for (authentic or autonomy-promoting) identities, than the 
unsettling of prevailing definitions of ―who we are.‖  
IV. TAKING STOCK 
In the years since Kymlicka and Taylor first elaborated their 
normative theories of the recognition of identity, and since Foucault 
and others developed accounts of identity as subjectification, critics 
have challenged each of these approaches. One important critique of 
strong multiculturalism emphasizes that recognition is always 
recognition of those who hold power within a particular group or 
 
 75. Id. at 28; see also MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM 180–83 (Talcott Parsons trans., 2000) (1930). 
 76. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom, 
in ETHICS: SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 281 (Paul Rabinow ed., Robert Hurkey trans., 1997). 
 77. They urge, in other words, the analysis of how extant identities came to be, and also 
the structure of their conditions of possibility. See BROWN, supra note 58, at ch. 5; MICHEL 
FOCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith, trans., 1972); Michel 
Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in THE FOUCAULT READER 76 (Paul Rabinow ed., 
1984).  
 78. See, e.g., CONNOLLY, supra note 59, at 91; CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARADOX (2000); James Tully, The Agonic Freedom of Citizens, 28 ECON. & SOC‘Y 161 
(1999); James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of 
Constitutional Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204 (2002); SHELDON WOLIN, Fugitive 
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
POLITICAL 31 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
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community. Rarely, if ever, is there a single, consensually agreed-
upon understanding of the values or the traditions of a national 
minority or another marginalized group. Instead, there are typically 
multiple accounts—accounts that diverge from, and sometimes 
conflict with, one another. When political theorists overlook this 
internal diversity—when they fail to attend to the relations of power 
that structure minority groups—their recommendations can have 
perverse, if unintended, consequences. The politics of recognition, 
critics worry, can exacerbate the hierarchies internal to marginalized 
groups, rendering women, sexual minorities, and others who are 
subject to what Cathy Cohen has called ―secondary marginalization‖ 
more vulnerable to the dominant members of their groups.
79
  
Liberal theorists of multicultural accommodation sometimes claim 
to circumvent this difficulty through their emphasis on the rights and 
freedoms of individuals.
80
 But critics of the liberal multiculturalist 
approach stress that not all groups, and certainly not all ―societal 
cultures,‖ enable autonomy. Many are patriarchal. Many are racist. 
Many are heterosexist and/or otherwise oppressive. Many, including 
many that are deeply constitutive of their members‘ personal 
identities, make remarkably bad candidates for ―contexts of choice.‖ 
Ayelet Shachar illustrates with the case of the Santa Clara Pueblo 
Indians, who deny membership to children whose fathers are not 
tribal members, even if their mothers are, and even if they were 
raised on the reservation as full participants in tribal life.
81
 This 
exclusion from membership translates into exclusion from important 
tribal benefits and services, including medical care, schooling, and 
housing assistance. Still, Shachar notes, Kymlicka endorses the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s decision to refrain from striking down these tribal 
 
 79. That is, marginalization within a marginalized group. CATHY COHEN, THE 
BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF BLACK POLITICS 27 (1999); see 
also AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND 
WOMEN‘S RIGHTS 2–3 (2001); K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: 
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); Susan Moller Okin, Is 
Multiculturalism Bad For Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Josh Cohen 
et al. eds., 1999). 
 80. See supra notes 20–45 and accompanying text. 
 81. SHACHAR, supra note 79, at 18–20. 
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membership rules.
82
 This case, she argues, illustrates the limits of the 
distinction between protections and restrictions. Protecting minority 
groups from impositions by the dominant and/or the majority culture 
often enables those who have power within groups to impose 
restrictions upon weak and vulnerable group members. 
Complaints have been leveled, as well, at the third, Foucaultian 
approach to theorizing identity. The most familiar is that it fails to 
distinguish better from worse forms of identification, and more 
generally to articulate a constructive (as opposed to a purely critical) 
normative vision.
83
 Even if all identities subject, critics argue, all are 
not reducible to subjection. Nor are all identities equivalent in the 
ways in which, and the degrees to which, they subordinate. Gendered 
identities in patriarchal societal cultures, for example, are not 
equivalent to the identities subjects form as members of feminist, gay 
rights, and other progressive social groups.
84
 Critics claim the refusal 
to spell out normative criteria for distinguishing the former from the 
latter renders the Foucaultian approach of limited value. Martha 
Nussbaum, for instance, in her vitriolic critique of Judith Butler, 
avers: ―It is one thing to say that we should be humble about our 
universal norms, and willing to learn from the experience of 
oppressed people. It is quite another thing to say we don‘t need any 
norms at all.‖85 
These critiques point to important weaknesses in each of the 
approaches surveyed above. Because they have been advanced 
persuasively by others, however, we will not rehearse them here. 
Instead, we want to highlight what strike us as two broad points of 
agreement among the approaches: agreement about the benefits of 
collective identification and about its burdens. Keeping these in 
sight—and keeping in mind the critiques of the strong 
 
 82. Id. at 31; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); KYMLICKA, 
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 21, at 165; SHACHAR, supra note 79, at 31. 
 83. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and 
Normative Confusions, 3 PRAXIS INT‘L 272 (1981); Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michel 
Foucault, 30 DISSENT 481 (1983).  
 84. See, e.g., AMY ALLEN, THE POLITICS OF OUR SELVES: POWER, AUTONOMY, AND 
GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY chs. 2–3 (2008) (containing a largely 
sympathetic critique of Foucault). 
 85. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 1999, at 37, 42. 
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multiculturalist, the liberal multiculturalist, and the Foucaultian 
positions—in our concluding Parts, we want to sketch an alternative. 
A constructivist and democratic approach, our claim is, can attend to 
the practices and relationships of oppression that were the point of 
departure for identity politics. It can attend to relations of power, not 
only among but also within groups, and it can do so while 
specifically addressing the normative-political question of the role the 
state should play in identity politics. 
A. Identity’s Benefits 
As emphasized by Taylor, because a nontrivial part of what 
people experience as their good is collective in constitution, 
individuals can suffer real harm from threats to the flourishing or 
survival of the collectivities with which they identify.
86
 People can be 
significantly harmed by the loss of social networks and of the 
relationships and solidarities they forge through shared practices, 
shared struggles, and other shared experiences. People can be 
harmed, not only by threats to groups that constitute ―cultural 
minorities,‖ but also by threats to identity-groups constructed through 
acts of oppression. Consider the experience of black Americans 
displaced by Urban Renewal, an experience the clinical psychologist 
Mindy Thompson Fullilove analogizes to ―root shock.‖87 Although 
the black ghetto was forged through acts of public and private 
coercion, Fullilove‘s claim is, its destruction occasioned a traumatic 
reaction due to the loss of what she calls an ―emotional ecosystem.‖88 
Clearly, one need not think blacks should be denied the freedom to 
exit majority-black communities, with a view to promoting the 
survival of something called ―black culture,‖ in order to appreciate 
the very real damage done by the U.S. state policy of ―slum 
clearance.‖89  
 
 86. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 87. See MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW TEARING UP CITY 
NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
 88. Id. at 11–17. 
 89. Many criticized urban renewal policy at an early stage. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, THE 
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban 
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Liberal theorists of recognition agree. They emphasize that, given 
that people value connection to others through identity, and given 
that nontrivial costs attend to surrendering those connections, it is 
unjust for members of dominant groups to compel minorities to bear 
that cost. One need not essentialize identity—one need not assume 
identity to be fixed and unchanging—to appreciate the injustice of 
requiring some to disavow their collective identifications and their 
solidaristic attachments to particular others as the price for full 
membership in their political societies.
90
  
Even Foucaultians accept this claim—or at least some accept it, 
up to a point. Identity is an ambiguous good, William Connolly 
argues.
91
 Still, it is an ambiguous good. Identity is instrumental to a 
politics that presses for the inclusion of the excluded, as well as to a 
social life that meets people‘s felt need for solidaristic relationships 
and particularistic attachments. For these reasons, it is often crucial 
for the marginalized to gain recognition for their delegitimized 
identities. Judith Butler, for instance, suggests this is the case for 
sexual minorities; that ―gaining recognition for [their] status. . . [is] a 
necessity for survival.‖92  
B. Identity’s Burdens 
Still, because identities constrain freedom—because they define 
―others‖ whose exclusion they can promote and at the same time 
legitimize—―the mobilization of identity categories for the purposes 
of politicization always remains threatened by the prospect of identity 
becoming an instrument of the power one opposes.‖93 Hence the 
Foucaultian emphasis on genealogizing and more generally on 
―refusing‖ identity, rather than urging states to recognize it via group 
rights, accommodations for minority cultures, or ―external‖ 
protections. As our discussion in Part III suggests, the Foucaultian 
focus is the cost of identification: its burdens, more so than its 
benefits. 
 
 90. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
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What is worth underscoring, however, is that neither strong 
multiculturalists nor liberal theorists of recognition quarrel with the 
claim that, very often, collective identities have costs. To the 
contrary, both sets of theorists acknowledge that groups exclude, and 
that groups often limit the freedom of members. Both acknowledge 
that some forms of recognition, because they give those who are 
dominant within groups power over those who are subordinate, can 
promote coercion and enable the restriction of freedom. It is this 
worry that drives Taylor‘s insistence that states protect minority 
group members‘ ―fundamental rights,‖ such as their rights to habeas 
corpus.
94
 It is this worry that informs Kymlicka‘s claim that states 
should only rarely allow ―internal restrictions‖ by groups.95 Practices 
of restricting religious freedom, or of discriminating against female 
group members, Kymlicka writes, ―are inconsistent with any system 
of minority rights that appeals to individual freedom or personal 
autonomy.‖96 They ―cannot be justified or defended,‖ he continues, 
―within a liberal conception of minority rights.‖97  
The principal differences between the multiculturalist and the 
Foucaultian positions are, first, their emphases—multiculturalists 
stress the benefits of identification, Foucaultians the burdens—and, 
second, their assumptions about the likely effects of state recognition. 
Multiculturalists underscore that well-being is closely bound up with 
a sense of collective belonging. The costs of identity, they suggest, 
are well worth the goods identity provides. As long as ―fundamental 
rights‖ are protected, as long as protections are ―external,‖ rather than 
restrictions on important rights and freedoms, people gain more than 
they lose when states recognize identity-constituting collectivities. 
The Foucaultian claim, by contrast, is that identity‘s substantial 
harms outweigh its benefits. Even those identities which liberals view 
as entirely beneficial—namely, the identities of autonomous, rational 
modern selves—subject, and they discipline human beings. Because 
people never perfectly fit any identity-category, and because efforts 
to make them fit are a kind of violence, state recognition, even when 
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it promotes solidaristic feelings of trust and belonging, always also 
fosters exclusion and nontrivial forms of unfreedom.  
V. IDENTITY-CONSTRUCTION AND THE STATE 
One might assume, based on the above, that the debate on identity 
politics in political theory has come to an impasse. Most theorists–
from the strong multiculturalist to the Foucaultian–agree identities 
can enable collective mobilization, foster solidarity, and promote 
other important political goods. At the same time, most agree they 
can fuel aggression toward their ―others‖ and severely constrain 
freedom. One might therefore conclude that the question ―How 
should states treat identity?‖ turns wholly on the empirical matter of 
whether the benefits of recognition in a given instance outweigh its 
harms; that there is no work to be done at the level of theory, in other 
words, that the normative-political question of the proper state 
response to identity politics can be answered only through case-by-
case cost-benefit analyses. 
This is not our view. Political theory, we want to suggest in the 
final sections of this Article, can and should continue to contribute to 
work on the role of the state in identity politics. Indeed, some of the 
most important work on this topic in recent years has been by 
theorists who are beginning to shift the terms of the debate.
98 
To 
frame identity politics‘ normative-political problem in terms of state 
―recognition‖—in terms of its benefits or its burdens—is a mistake, 
their claim is. Although Taylor‘s work in the early 1990s performed 
the critically important task of drawing attention to the limits of 
toleration and initiating a conversation about other state responses to 
identity politics, his language—indeed, the very logic of—
―recognition‖ misleads. The term ―recognition,‖ along with much of 
the debate about identity that has been conducted using that term, 
implies, erroneously, that states merely react to–that they 
―acknowledge the existence or truth of‖ (or, alternatively, refuse to 
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acknowledge)—racial, national, ethnic, gendered, and other 
collective identities.
99
 
But states never simply ―recognize‖ (or refuse to recognize) 
identities. Instead, they play a crucial role in producing and 
reproducing them. States strongly shape national identities, for 
example, through citizenship law and family law.
100
 States strongly 
shape racial, ethnic, and gender identities, as well. They 
institutionalize them in legal norms and in policies, for example, in 
census categories, and in the case of race in the United States, in 
racial zoning laws and explicitly racist federal housing policies.
101
 
States vest some, but not other, identities with public significance by 
distributing resources and opportunities along group lines.
102
 They 
thus influence how citizens identify, and incentivize people to 
organize and mobilize as members of particular groups.  
States construct identities, in other words, even before people 
advance political claims in their names, shaping group boundaries, 
group norms, and group practices, through laws, policies, and 
political institutions. What is more, when people press claims in the 
name of identity, state responses to those claims never simply 
―acknowledge [identity‘s] existence or truth‖ (or fail to). Instead, 
they actively produce and reproduce identity. Recall Charles Taylor‘s 
example of the proposed Meech amendment to the Canadian 
constitution. Even Taylor would acknowledge that the Canadian state 
changes Quebecois culture when it gives French-speaking parents the 
right to educate their children in English.
103
 Indeed, the force of the 
example is his claim that the state changes culture when it acts to 
transform a linguistic tradition that comprises an important element 
of a particular identity. We want to underscore, however, that even if 
the Meech amendment had passed—if the Canadian state had legally 
enabled the Quebecois to restrict parents‘ educational choices—state 
actors still would have shaped Quebecois culture. They would not (as 
Taylor suggests) merely have enabled the survival of authentic 
 
 99. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 100. JACQUELINE STEVENS, REPRODUCING THE STATE (1999). 
 101. Clarissa Hayward, The Difference States Make: Democracy, Identity, and the 
American City, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 501 (2003). 
 102. JUNG, supra note 97, at 19.  
 103. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
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traditions and practices. Instead, they would have lent the coercive 
force of the state to those who would perpetuate the linguistic status 
quo, helping them prevail against those who would challenge and 
change what it means to be Quebecois. 
Similarly, when the U.S. enabled the Santa Clara Pueblos to 
exclude from membership the children of women who marry outside 
the tribe, it lent the coercive force of the state to those who favored a 
particular set of membership rules. It helped some tribal members 
prevail in their struggle against others—others who challenged, and 
who hoped to change, those rules. As Sarah Song shows in her 
insightful analysis of this case, the U.S. shaped Pueblo identity, and it 
did so in ways that reproduced and reinforced the patriarchal norms 
of the larger society.
104
  
To be clear, our claim is not that a different outcome in the 
Martinez case would have constituted state non-intervention. To the 
contrary, we want to underscore that identity groups—those 
collectivities which people experience as deeply constitutive of their 
personal identities—rarely, if ever, define themselves independently 
and consensually. Members of groups—along with those non-
members who vie for membership—struggle and negotiate with one 
another to create and re-create group boundaries and group norms. 
They do so in interaction with other groups, and in interaction with 
the major institutions of their political society. In Song‘s words, 
―cultures are not entities that exist prior to social and political 
interactions but rather are created in and through them.‖105 
Song characterizes the latter claim as a ―modest‖ constructivist 
view. This view does not imply, she writes, ―that cultures are always 
radically heterogenous and contested.‖106 We suspect most theorists 
writing on identity—strong multiculturalists, liberal multiculturalists, 
and Foucaultians alike—would accept as noncontroversial this 
modest constructivism. Still, the constructed and contested nature of 
identity is obscured when the normative-political debate is framed in 
terms of ―recognition.‖ A case in point is Kymlicka‘s reasoning with 
respect to Martinez. He endorses the U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
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not on the grounds that gender-biased membership rules are good 
rules.
107
 (Recall, he specifically cites these rules as an instance of 
―internal restriction‖—an identity harm, to use the language 
introduced in Part IV). Instead, Kymlicka endorses the decision on 
the grounds that it refrains from ―interven[ing] forcibly to compel the 
Pueblo council to respect [female members‘] rights.‖108 He supports 
state accommodation of the Santa Clara Pueblos, in other words, 
because he worries state ―intervention‖ is coercive.  
The trouble with his reasoning (and with similar reasoning by 
others) is that accommodation is a form of intervention—a form that 
enables and promotes coercion. When state actors enable some tribal 
members to discriminate against others, when they enforce gender-
biased property rights (or any property rights, for that matter), when 
they distribute educational opportunities and basic resources, such as 
housing and medical care and education, in ways that reproduce and 
reinforce some particular set of norms—any particular set of norms—
they intervene in, and they help to shape, identity. At the same time, 
they coerce those who contest the particular norms they enforce.  
Kymlicka‘s reasoning would be sound, of course, if the answer to 
the question, ―Who are the Santa Clara Pueblos?‖ were settled and 
stable—if there existed some obvious and unproblematic definition of 
the tribe‘s (authentic) traditions and of its (true) boundaries. The very 
fact that this case arose, however, is evidence there is not. Any 
conceivable state action, including accommodation and other forms 
of recognition, contributes to identity-construction. It does not simply 
―acknowledge [identity‘s] existence or truth,‖ but rather makes 
identity, in some particular, contestable form.  
 
 107. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 108. KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 21, at 165 (emphasis added). 
Kymlicka goes on to analogize liberal states‘ ―imposition‖ on cultural minorities to colonial 
efforts to export liberal principles to nonliberal states. Id. at 166. Of course, if the question at 
hand were whether the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe ought to use sexually discriminatory 
membership rules, as Kymlicka makes clear, his answer would be a resounding ―no.‖ Still, he 
argues, the state should not intervene to ―impose liberalism.‖ ―[W]hat third party,‖ he asks, 
rhetorically, ―has the authority to intervene forcibly to compel the Pueblo council to respect 
[members‘] rights?‖ Id. at 165. 
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VI. DEMOCRATIZING IDENTITY 
Among the important contributions Foucaultians have made to the 
identity debate in political theory is to draw attention to the danger 
inherent in seeking state solutions to identity‘s harms. In Wendy 
Brown‘s words, the turn to the state ―casts the law in particular and 
the state more generally as neutral arbiters of injury rather than as 
themselves invested with the power to injure. . . . [T]he effort to 
‗outlaw‘ social injury,‖ ―powerfully legitimizes law and the state as 
appropriate protectors against injury and casts injured individuals as 
needing such protectors‖109 
The Foucaultian alternative, however–the turn to genealogizing, 
and more generally to ―refusing‖ identity—remains unsatisfying, for 
obvious reasons. If states shape and reshape identity, if states never 
simply acknowledge, but always also help define ―who we are,‖ then 
theorists must ask how states do so, and how they might do so 
differently. As argued above, states distribute resources and 
opportunities and define rewards and sanctions in ways that affect 
how people are able and how they are motivated to perform identity. 
For this reason, the injunction, ―Perform identity differently!‖ often 
rings hollow. Judith Butler famously celebrates drag as a form of 
resistance to dominant definitions of sex/gender.
110
 But such a 
performance, by itself, is insufficient to challenge the institutions that 
incentivize people to perform their identities as prescribed. Recall 
Richard Ford‘s example of the rules and the reward structure of 
Argentine tango. Although Ford does not discuss them, the gay 
milongas of Buenos Aires, where women often lead (including 
women who self-identify as ―straight‖), at least partly destabilize the 
gendered norms of the dance. Still, it would be naïve to regard gay 
milongueros as mounting an effective political challenge to 
patriarchal and heterosexist normative structures.  
Nor are contestatory identity-performances even minimally 
effective in some political contexts. What is the analogue of the drag 
performance for those excluded from membership in the Santa Clara 
Pueblo tribe? Should the mother whose children are denied member 
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status resist by ―performing‖ their inclusion? Should she perform 
their provision with healthcare, and with housing and schooling, as 
well? One need only pose questions such as these to appreciate the 
limits of an anti-institutional response.  
States are not, as Wendy Brown reminds us, ―neutral arbiters of 
injury.‖111 They cannot ―recognize‖ identity without helping 
construct it. Nor can they construct identity in ways that are 
noncontroversial. But that does not mean every conceivable state 
construction of identity is equivalent, or that political theorists should 
refuse to address the question, ―How should states construct 
identity?‖ If state actors necessarily make and remake identity, we 
want to argue in this final Part, they should do so in ways that render 
identitarian norms, boundaries, and practices as responsive as 
possible to those they affect. To construct identity democratically is a 
matter, less of ―recognizing‖ it, than promoting nondomination, by 
which we mean that state of power relations in which all participants 
are enabled, and equally so, to challenge and change, or alternatively 
to defend, their terms.
112
  
Nondomination in identity politics has at least three important 
dimensions. First, in every multicultural and socially stratified 
political society, it has an inter-group dimension, since in such 
societies relations of power tend to follow group lines. Second, 
whenever group boundaries are controversial, whenever group 
practices are internally contested and relations of power within 
groups hierarchical, nondomination has an intra-group dimension. 
Third and finally, nondomination has a systemic dimension, since 
people are unfree when subjected to social, yet impersonal forms of 
power, such as the power of norms that are deeply entrenched (for 
instance, because naturalized or sacralized).
113
  
 
 111. BROWN, supra note 58; see also supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text. 
 112. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 66–67 
(1997) (using traditional republican definition of non-domination as meaning a freedom 
everyone should have and is ―the absence of domination in the presence of other people, not the 
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States should construct and reconstruct identity, our view is, with 
a view to promoting inter-group, intra-group, and systemic 
nondomination. In some cases, promoting nondomination along the 
first (inter-group) dimension may require the very political 
institutions multiculturalists recommend. It may require various 
forms of group rights, for instance, or even relatively broad powers of 
group self-government. The aim, however, is not to protect and 
preserve ―cultures,‖ but to reverse significant identity-based forms of 
domination.  
Promoting nondomination along the second (inter-group) 
dimension typically will require defining and protecting a wide range 
of individual rights. Intra-group nondomination requires rights to 
exit, to cite one important example. It requires individual political 
rights that ensure effective participation in the processes through 
which group boundaries and norms are defined. The aim, however, is 
not to promote individual autonomy, but to reduce—ideally to 
eliminate—the arbitrary exercise of power by some group members 
over others.
114
 
Promoting nondomination along the third (systemic) dimension 
requires state action to ensure the malleability of group norms and 
group boundaries: to ensure their responsiveness, that is, to the 
human subjects whose lives they govern. To be sure, it may be the 
case—contra some theorists of ―agonistic‖ democracy—that in a 
given social context it would be infelicitous to destabilize a particular 
identitarian practice.
115
 Even still, that practice should be in principle 
open to challenge and change. The institutions that best promote this 
systemic form of nondomination are procedurally democratic 
institutions that foster contestatory forms of political engagement in 
 
then men and women alike would be dominated in the systemic sense. Men and women alike 
would be systemically unfree, even if men dominated women interpersonally. 
 114. For Pettit, power‘s exercise is arbitrary when at the discretion of a powerful agent, 
who is not constrained to track the interests and opinions of the agent her action affects. See 
Pettit, supra note 110, at 52–58. But see Frank N. Lovett, Domination: A Preliminary Analysis, 
84 THE MONIST 98, 102–04 (2001) (providing a critical analysis of Pettit‘s arbitrary ―power 
requirement‖).  
 115. See generally Monique Deveaux, Agonism and Pluralism, 25 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 
1 (1999) (providing a persuasive critique of agonistic democracy). 
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which people critique and defend, and sometimes transform, the 
groups with which they identify. 
Consider again the case of the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe. As argued 
in Part V, the problem with the U.S. Supreme Court response was not 
that it constituted state intervention. Either choice the Court might 
have made–to overturn the tribe‘s membership rules or to uphold 
them—would have been coercive, since either action would have 
used public power to support a particular subset of tribal members in 
their struggle with their opponents. Nor, however, is the problem that 
the state transformed the (authentic) identity of this tribe, or that it 
failed to promote liberal autonomy. Instead, from a democratic–
constructivist perspective, the problem is that the Court helped 
construct Santa Clara identity in a way that promoted intragroup 
domination. It reinforced and legitimized the power of the tribal 
council to make collective decisions (in this case, decisions about 
who is admitted to tribal membership, and who is not) that 
profoundly affect some people who are excluded from the processes 
by which they are made.
116
  
Court-imposed liberal rules would not have avoided the difficulty. 
Indeed, to use the terms introduced above, state-enforced 
liberalization of the tribe‘s membership rules would have constituted 
intergroup domination. The liberal state, without politically engaging 
those affected, would have imposed upon the Santa Clara tribe its 
preferred norms and its preferred boundaries.  
The best way for the Supreme Court to promote nondomination in 
the Martinez case would have been for it to mandate that those 
significantly affected by membership rules—including not only tribal 
leaders and tribal members, but also people excluded from 
membership, who contested their exclusion—engage one another 
politically to determine tribal membership rules. The state should 
 
 116. The Supreme Court‘s decision therefore violated a deeply held value in democracies, 
what democratic theorists call the ―principle of affected interests‖: the principle, to quote 
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defense of this principle).  
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have mandated, in other words, an inclusive and egalitarian 
democratic political contest.  
The justices involved likely would have rejected any proposal 
along these lines, on the grounds that it is interventionist. The Court‘s 
position was that it should not interfere in tribal matters. The Santa 
Clara Pueblos, the Martinez ruling stressed, constitute ―an Indian 
tribe that has been in existence for over 600 years.‖117 The U.S. 
Congress, the Court claimed, has demonstrated time and again its 
―desire not to intrude needlessly on tribal self government.‖118 Hence, 
the justices reasoned, American state actors should not intervene to 
shape the rules and the norms that govern this tribe.  
Their position, however, is incoherent. The U.S. government has 
involved itself intimately in shaping Santa Clara Pueblo rules and 
procedures, not excluding the very procedures at stake in Martinez. 
Although it may be the case that this tribe in some form has been in 
existence for 600 years, the constitution according to which it 
governed itself when the Court handed down its 1978 decision was 
largely the work of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs just four 
decades earlier.
119
 The Bureau wrote much of the Pueblo Constitution 
in 1935. It inserted into that constitution the provision on which 
Martinez turned: the provision barring tribal members from appealing 
council decisions in U.S. courts.
120
 
Indeed, the membership rules enshrined in the constitution were 
considerably more inclusive than the rules the tribal council 
determined. According to the 1935 document, ―All children of mixed 
marriages between members of the Santa Clara pueblo and 
nonmembers, provided such children have been recognized and 
adopted by the council‖ were to be admitted as full members of the 
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 120. Id. at xxviii. Biolsi notes that ―the BIA determined as a general rule for IRA 
constitutions that there would be no separation of powers in tribal government . . . [they were] 
unnecessary complexities for new tribal governments supposedly just learning during the New 
Deal how self-government works.‖ Id. He also points out that several Santa Clara members 
questioned the idea that the Council‘s decisions could not be appealed to courts outside the 
pueblo. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:9 
 
 
tribe.
121
 Any change to the constitution, this document made clear, 
required approval by a majority of a quorum of at least thirty percent 
of adult tribal members and ratification by the U.S. Secretary of the 
Interior.
122
 A simple vote by the tribal council was insufficient to 
change membership rules. Hence, without exercising intergroup 
domination, the U.S. Court might have interpreted the move to 
categorically exclude the children of women who marry outside the 
tribe as a constitutional change. The state might have mandated 
public deliberation on this proposed change, followed by a vote open 
to all affected. Had it taken this path, it would have substantially 
amplified the voice of the Martinezes, as well as that of other parents 
in their position, reducing intragroup domination.  
What if there were no such provision in the 1935 Constitution? 
What if, instead, that document had enshrined, irrevocably, 
patriarchal membership rules? If so, by our view, the case would 
constitute an instance of not only intragroup, but also systemic 
domination: collective norms rendered unresponsive to those whom 
they govern, in this case via institutional-procedural means. In such a 
case, although the Court should not impose new constitutional rules, 
it should require politically egalitarian and inclusive deliberation and 
collective decision-making processes: processes that take those laws 
as their subject.  
The precise form such processes should take will vary with 
context. In some cases, courts might mandate periodic constitutional 
conventions, for instance, or the regular reconsideration of 
membership rules and other significant group norms. The goal in 
each instance would be to ensure that the terms of the power relations 
that constitute identities are not firmly settled, once and for all, but 
instead open, at least in principle, to challenge and change by those 
they affect. 
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CONCLUSION 
We began this Article with the famous Combahee River 
Collective Statement. In a sense we have ended with it, as well. 
Identity matters for political life, we have argued, neither because it 
expresses who people ―really‖ are—that is, some deep truth about the 
(authentic) self—nor because one‘s ascribed identity in its canonical 
form is the necessary context for autonomy and other liberal goods. 
Instead, we have emphasized, identity matters politically because 
people are so very often dominated along identitarian lines. 
―Recognition,‖ we have argued, is rarely adequate to challenge such 
identity-based domination. Instead, our constructivist-democratic 
alternative recommends that states promote nondomination, in the 
form of inclusive and egalitarian political contests over the identities 
at the heart of ―identity politics.‖ 
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